Transnational Repression by the CCP on U.S. Soil

The House of Commons of the Canadian Parliament

Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

Transnational Repression in Developing Democracies

November 26, 2024

Written testimony by

Frances Hui

Policy and Advocacy Coordinator,

Watch online here

Part 1: Opening Remarks

Good afternoon, Chair El-Khoury, Vice-chair Lake, Vice-chair Brunelle-Duceppe, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

My name is Frances Hui, and I am the Policy and Advocacy Coordinator of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK) Foundation, which campaigns for the freedom of political prisoners in Hong Kong. I was born and raised in Hong Kong and have been advocating for its democratic development since I was 14 years old.

In 2020, after China imposed its draconian National Security Law in Hong Kong (HKNSL), I sought asylum in the United States due to the risk of arrest for my international advocacy for Hong Kong’s democracy and freedom. Now based in Washington, D.C., I continue to speak out on the Chinese government’s abuses in Hong Kong and beyond. Last year the Hong Kong authorities issued an arrest warrant and placed a HK$1 million bounty on my head under the HKNSL.

This illustrates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deploys transnational repression to silence dissent, targeting not only activists like me but also Uyghurs, Tibetans, Taiwanese, and Chinese dissidents globally. Freedom House identifies the CCP’s campaign of transnational repression as the world’s most comprehensive. Its methods include spyware, intimidation, disinformation, surveillance, and threats against dissidents’ family members back home, all designed to suppress dissent far beyond its borders. A key player in this strategy is the CCP’s United Front Work Department, which controls and mobilizes organizations and individuals on the Party’s behalf. The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices (HKETOs), located in Toronto and around the world, are operating with quasi-diplomatic status to promote Beijing’s narrative, influence foreign policies, and monitor dissidents.

In 2019 and 2020, a U.S. citizen in Boston was tasked by Beijing to spy on my activities. He had attended my events, taken photos and videos, and shared them directly with PRC officials. But this man was not just spying on me — between 2018 and 2022 he provided intelligence about members and leaders of Chinese family associations and community organizations, and anti-CCP dissidents to the PRC officials, including those working with the United Front Work Department.

In one instance, he mobilized hundreds of pro-Beijing individuals to counter-protest a march we organized on August 18, 2019, in a series of global actions in support of the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement. Some of the people vandalized our belongings and physically intimidated us. In group messages, they had discussed bringing weapons to attack the participants and even firearms to “shoot [me] in the face.” After the rally, I was followed home and had to call the police twice for assistance. It appeared to be a globally coordinated effort as similar counter-protests took place at other pro-democracy Hong Kong rallies happening in other cities, including in Vancouver and Toronto, where CCP supporters physically threatened and intimidated participants of the rallies.

The repression didn’t stop there. After Hong Kong issued its bounty for my arrest last year, the harassment intensified. A week later, my mother in Hong Kong was brought in for police questioning. I regularly receive phone calls from Chinese-speaking men who know my name. These tactics aim to isolate and intimidate, with profound psychological, social, and political impacts.

Today’s hearing is so critical, because Canada, with its large diaspora communities, is particularly vulnerable to transnational repression and foreign interference. It is crucial to take timely and decisive action to address this issue and protect both your citizens and national security.

I urge Canada to make full use of its sanction authorities to hold bad actors accountable. It should also consider revoking the HKETO’s diplomatic immunities and privileges as it has now become an outpost for the Chinese government to surveil and propagandize its own agenda on Canadian soil. I have included my other policy recommendations at the end of this written testimony.

As I testify today, 45 pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong—some of them close friends of mine—have recently been sentenced to four to ten years in prison for organizing a democratic primary election. This is the grim reality of life under authoritarian rule. But the repression goes beyond that, as you’ve heard. My story is just one example of how Beijing’s transnational authoritarianism, driven by tools like the United Front and the HKETOs, threatens freedom and democracy worldwide.

Lastly, I would like to applaud this parliament for passing the Countering Foreign Interference Act in June this year. It was a great step forward and I hope this government will continue to take meaningful and leading steps to protect individuals and your sovereignty from transnational repression.

I appreciate the committee’s efforts in addressing this issue, and I look forward to your questions.

Part II: Case Spotlight—The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices (HKETOs)

The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices are overseas representative offices of the Hong Kong government originally established to foster economic and commercial interests with countries abroad. They are located around the world, including one in Toronto and three in the United States.

In the lead-up to the British transfer of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the Canadian government granted the HKETO in Toronto special privileges and immunities as a consular post in recognition of Hong Kong’s autonomy from the PRC under the “Sino-British Joint Declaration.” This gives the staff of the HKETO and family members a form of diplomatic immunity under the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, which includes immunity from legal process, search-and-seize and pre-boarding screening at airports, and so forth.

However, under Beijing’s increasing control over Hong Kong’s day-to-day affairs since the 2020 HKNSL, the HKETOs are serving little diplomatic purpose that is distinct or autonomous from the Chinese Embassy. Instead, they have evolved to serve two main roles: Promoting propaganda for Hong Kong and Beijing and tracking Hong Kong dissidents abroad.

Promoting Propaganda and Influencing American Policies to Whitewash CCP Atrocities

In the past few years, the HKETOs have been active in organizing events under the guise of promoting Hong Kong’s culture and economy. They aim to present to the world a prosperous image of Hong Kong under the HKNSL to distract from their human rights abuses and the political crackdown on pro-democracy voices in Hong Kong.

Conducting Espionage and Surveillance on Overseas Dissidents

In May 2024, British authorities arrested three men for national security offenses related to assisting the Hong Kong intelligence service and foreign interference, including information gathering, spying on pro-democracy activists, and forcing entry into a residential home. One of them was Bill Yuen, the manager of the London HKETO. According to the prosecution, Yuen paid the two defendants using the HKETO’s bank account for carrying out those acts.

In June and December 2023, the Hong Kong authorities placed HK$1 million bounties on 13 overseas activists, including six in the United Kingdom, five in the U.S., and two in Australia. The HKETOs, which have bases in all these countries, are well-situated to monitor, gather information, and even intimidate these activists and other dissidents, including those in Canada, posing a threat to the safety of them and their families.

In countries where the HKETOs are based, China is given two separate diplomatic representations and privileges. Under the knowledge that Hong Kong is no longer autonomous from Beijing and that the HKETOs are working on behalf of the PRC government, these governments should immediately review the legitimacy of these offices’ diplomatic status.

Current Legislative Efforts on This Issue

In the Canadian parliament, a petition has called the government to revoke the Toronto HKETO’s diplomatic status. The petition e-5137 was signed by nearly 3,500 people and was introduced to the House on November 19, 2024, by Jenny Kwan MP.

In the U.S., bipartisan legislation—the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices (HKETO) Certification Act—was introduced in both the House and Senate seeking an administrative determination on HKETOs’ special immunity and privileges. Should the Act pass in the Senate, the administration will be obliged to determine whether the diplomatic immunity and privileges should be revoked. Once it’s determined that the HKETOs do not merit diplomatic immunity and privileges, the three HKETOs in the U.S. will be required to shut down. This past September, the U.S. House passed the bill with an overwhelming 413-3 vote.

Part III: Policy Recommendations

Many victims of transnational repression in Canada reported holding back from seeking government assistance because they are disappointed and frustrated by past experiences, believing that they are not going to be helped and that nothing is going to change systematically to address the issue.

Transnational repression threatens not only the personal safety of people residing in Canada but Canada’s national security overall. When the international community fails to develop a more reliable mechanism that holds bad actors accountable and protects its people from repression by foreign countries, we are undermining the work of governments and civil society to understand the strategies of these foreign countries and to address them correctly. Silence and inaction risk emboldening these assaults. Therefore, more robust actions need to be taken to hold authoritarian states and those who are co-opting with those states accountable for carrying out transnational repression. This government should:

1. Make full use of the Global Magnitsky Act and its other sanctioning authorities to hold bad actors accountable for intimidating and threatening overseas Hong Kongers, in cooperation with multinational allies.

2. Revoke the diplomatic status of the HKETO in Toronto.

3. Codify and define transnational repression in the criminal code.

4. Ensure the implementation of the recently enacted Countering Foreign Interference Act.

5. Provide victims of transnational repression with emotional, personal, and legal support.

6. Provide training to law enforcement agencies on handling reports of transnational repression.

7. Provide education for civil society and human rights defenders, especially those who are most vulnerable and subject to high risk of transnational repression, to better handle threats or actual violence and to take precautionary measures to protect themselves.

8. Develop an interagency commission on transnational repression to tackle the issue in a coordinated and well-rounded approach.

9. Develop a two-way communication line between intelligence agencies and civil society that allows the exchange of information which can be useful for further investigation and to keep victims informed of potential threats.